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What moral philosophers can learn from the history of moral concepts. 
The essays in this volume belong to many disciplines: moral philosophy, intellectual history, 
theology and historical linguistics. They are gathered together in the conviction that these 
disciplines have much to learn from one another, and in particular that moral philosophy, my 
own discipline, has much to learn from all the others. It is this latter conviction that I want to 
defend in this essay, which can be regarded as a manifesto for the volume as a whole.     
Moral philosophers, at least in the English speaking world, have generally taken little interest 
in the history of moral concepts. There are a few honourable exceptions – Bernard Williams, 
Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor spring to mind – but their example has by and large 
not been followed by the younger generation. What explains this neglect? Institutional 
pressures of a kind familiar across the academic world – growing specialisation, the lure of 
formal methods – have played a part, no doubt; but beyond this there are causes specific to 
moral philosophy as this has been practiced in Britain and America over the last century.  
The “realists” who dominated British moral philosophy between the wars – Ross, Prichard, 
Ewing and Broad – regarded morality as reducible to a small set of changeless principles, 
knowable by direct intuition. Morality has no history. To be sure, theorising about morality 
has a history, but this must be regarded as a history of more or less erroneous descriptions of 
the same timeless subject matter. (By analogy, the world of numbers has no history, though 
its investigation by humans obviously does.) It is characteristic of this approach that Plato 
and Aristotle were seen as attempting to get clear about the very same concepts that 
preoccupy modern moral philosophers, only failing rather badly. Such smugness drove R. G. 
Collingwood (for one) to distraction. “It was like having a nightmare,” he wrote in his 
autobiography,  
about a man who had got it into his head that τριήρης was the Greek for 
‘steamer’, and when it was pointed out to him that descriptions of triremes in 
Greek writers were at any rate not very good descriptions of steamers, replied 
triumphantly, ‘That is just what I say. These Greek philosophers … were 
terribly muddle-headed, and their theory of steamers is all wrong’.1 
                                                 
1 R. G. Collingwood, An Autobiography (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1939), 64.  
Realism was swept aside by logical positivism in the 1930s and 40s, but its ahistoricism was 
perpetuated, indeed accentuated, by the new movement. Ross and Prichard had at least given 
some thought to the history of their subject, but the generation that followed felt at liberty to 
ignore this entirely. Russell and Wittgenstein had taught it that philosophy’s task is to 
uncover the universal (even “transcendental”) form of language, including moral language. 
The differences between our moral terms and those of Homer are no more philosophically 
significant than the differences between (say) inflected and uninflected languages; they 
merely serve to conceal an underlying sameness of logical structure. This doctrine found its 
monument in R. M. Hare’s The Language of Morals, published in 1952. Note “language” in 
the singular, and the definite article. There is, by implication, only one language of morals, 
though its dialects may vary.  
Illusions of translatability 
The idea of a universal “language of morals” is on the face of it rather implausible. After all, 
it is notorious that several core terms of that language, including “right”, “duty”, “ought” and 
“moral” itself, have no exact counterparts in many historical languages. “If someone 
professes to be expounding Aristotle and talks in a modern fashion about ‘moral’ such and 
such, he must be very imperceptive if he does not constantly feel like someone whose jaws 
have somehow got out of alignment”, wrote Elizabeth Anscombe famously.2 “Moral” cannot 
be translated directly into ancient Greek. Neither can any of the other words in the list above. 
The universalist will be unimpressed by this response. Concepts are not tied in a one-to-one 
fashion to particular words, he will insist; they can be expressed by a variety of words in 
combination. For instance, Russian has no one word for blue. Instead it has two words, sinie, 
“dark blue”, and goluboi, “light blue”. But this does not mean that monoglot Russian 
speakers lack the concept of blue, since anything we can say using “blue” they can say using 
a disjunction of sinie and goluboi. More precisely, any state of affairs in which  “x is blue” is 
true will be one in which the corresponding Russian sentence “x is sinie or goluboi” is true, 
and any state of affairs in which  “x is blue” is false will be one in which the corresponding 
Russian sentence “x is sinie or goluboi” is false. And that, on one common view of the 
matter, is all it means to say that Russians possess the concept of blue. 
                                                 
2 G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”,  Philosophy 33/124 (Jan., 1958), 1-19, 2.  
The universalist will make a similar point about moral concepts. English, like other modern 
European languages, draws a distinction between shame, which can be provoked by any kind 
of failure or shortcoming, of one’s own or of one’s associates, and guilt, which is specifically 
a response to one’s own acts and omissions. Ancient Greek made no such distinction. Here, 
one word, aidōs, usually translated “shame”, covered the whole territory that we divide 
between “shame” and “guilt”. But we needn’t deny ancient Greeks the concept of guilt, the 
universalist will insist, so long as they were able (as they clearly were) to pick out in words 
the kind of aidōs which looks specifically to one’s own misdoings and is bound up with a 
fear of retribution and a desire to make amends. In short, the ancient Greeks possessed the 
concept of guilt implicitly, insofar as they had the verbal resources to spell it out circuitously. 
That they lacked a distinct word for it is beside the point.  
The universalist thesis can now be stated more precisely: all intellectually mature humans 
understand the core moral concepts, either explicitly (they have special words to express 
them) or implicitly (they can convey them using a variety of words in combination). Either 
way, it does not matter. The important point is that the philosophical analysis of the core 
moral concepts can proceed as it has always done in the analytic tradition, without reference 
to the variety of human languages and cultures.  
I mistrust this appeal to implicit understanding. It seems to me a mistake to say that anyone 
who can string together some conjunction or disjunction of terms extensionally equivalent to 
“guilt” possesses the concept of guilt. Words matter. To see why, consider “blue” again. 
Even if it is translatable salva veritate as “sinie or goluboi”, it does not follow that anyone 
who understands “sinie or goluboi” thereby has the concept of blue, for to have the concept 
of blue is to see all shades of blue as shades of one and the same colour, which is precisely 
what those who think in terms of sinie and goluboi cannot do. “Blue” directs our attention to 
similarities that would otherwise go unnoticed, or (as Russians would doubtless have it) sinie 
and goluboi focus our gaze on differences that would otherwise be obscured.3 The contrast is 
the familiar one between “lumpers” and “splitters”. English speakers are lumpers when it 
comes to blue but splitters when it comes to pink and red. From the lumper’s standpoint, pink 
just is light red, yet it is hard for us to see it that way. For one thing, pink has acquired a raft 
                                                 
3 There is some scientific evidence that Russian and English speakers do indeed differ in the way they 
discriminate shades of blue. See  New Scientist Daily News, 1 May 2007: 
https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn11759-russian-speakers-get-the-blues/ 
of symbolic meanings – think of Barbie dolls etc. – unimaginable in a linguistic culture that 
spoke only of “light red”. 
Similar considerations apply to shame and guilt. Even if “guilt” is translatable salva veritate 
as “aidōs of such and such a type, occasioned by actions of such and such a type”, we cannot 
assume that anyone who grasps this latter phrase possesses the concept of guilt, for to see an 
emotion as a type of aidōs is to make of it something other than it would be if taken as a thing 
in its own right. “Even though some reactions in [Greek] societies were structured in the 
same way as our reactions of guilt”, wrote Bernard Williams, 
they were not simply guilt if they were not separately recognised as such; just 
as shame is not the same when it does not have guilt as a contrast. What 
people’s ethical emotions are depends significantly on what they take them to 
be. The truth about Greek societies, and in particular the Homeric, is not that 
they failed to recognise any of the reactions that we associate with guilt, but 
that they did not make of those reactions the special thing that they become 
when they are separately recognised as guilt.4 
Williams himself was a lumper when it came to shame and guilt. He thought that making a 
“special thing” of the reactions associated with guilt obscured rather than clarified those 
reactions, by detaching them from a sense of the self and its relation to others. “Shame can 
understand guilt, but guilt cannot understand itself”, he wrote memorably.5 But that is a 
further point. My claim here is simply that we cannot sensibly analyse the concepts of guilt 
and shame in abstraction from the history of the words by means of which they have been 
expressed.  
The words aidōs and “guilt” are at any rate not co-extensional, but even where two words are 
co-extensional we cannot assume that they express the same concept. Take “homosexual” 
and “gay”. I suppose there is a sense in which all homosexuals are gay and all gays 
homosexual, yet the two words – the one coldly medicalising, the other cheerfully affirmative 
– belong to different worlds of thought and feeling. One can understand why many gay 
people refuse the label “homosexual”. Conversely, the late Allan Bloom insisted that he was 
                                                 
4 Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 91.  
5 Williams, Shame and Necessity, 93.  
not “gay”, though he slept with men. “Invert” was his preferred self-description.6 
Homosexuality – or whatever one wants to call it – is not something independent of the 
various names it travels under. It depends significantly on what it is taken to be.  
The culprit in the background here is a certain conception of meaning popular among analytic 
philosophers, according to which two names or descriptive phrases mean the same just in 
case they pick out the same class of objects. That conception of meaning may be useful for 
the analysis of scientific and mathematical language – the purpose for which it was originally 
devised –  but it is woefully inadequate to the language of human action and feeling. This is 
because human actions and feelings, unlike numbers and molecules, are not wholly 
independent of the words we use to articulate them; when those words change, they change 
too. The planet Venus is what it is regardless whether we refer to it as the Morning or the 
Evening Star, but a person’s state of feeling may differ significantly depending on whether he 
thinks of it as aidōs or guilt. This is just one aspect of the reflexive or “hermeneutic” 
character of human self-understanding, on which much ink has been spilt.  
A couple of clarifying points. First, I am not rejecting all appeals to implicit understanding. 
Many languages lack words corresponding to “voluntary”, but insofar as speakers of those 
languages are inclined to excuse people for doing things by mistake or under compulsion 
they may be said to possess the concept of the voluntary implicitly. A similar point applies to 
action, intention and identity. All these are philosophers’ concepts, devised for special 
analytic purposes. We can impute them to speakers who lack the corresponding words 
without fear of foisting on them some culturally specific weltanschauung – or at least so it 
may be argued, though in fact the boundaries of the weltanschaulich are unclear and many 
purportedly neutral analyses conceal substantive ethical assumptions.  
Second, I am not denying that concepts such as shame, gratitude and courage correspond to 
something universal in human experience. We immediately understand the shame of Adam 
and Eve when they were seen naked by God after eating the fruit; if we did not, the Genesis 
story would mean little to us. This primordial something to which all conceptions of shame 
etc. relate is what permits us to say that some of those conceptions are uniquely true, insofar 
as they disclose that something more directly and luminously than others. Philosophy need 
not cede its place to cultural history entirely. But more on this anon. 
                                                 
6 At least, if Saul Bellow’s thinly fictionalised account is to be trusted. See Saul Bellow, Ravelstein (London: 
Viking, 2000), 160. 
Concepts as abstractions from linguistic practice 
Few contemporary analytic philosophers believe that there is a universal language of morals 
whose logic we can hope to uncover, yet they continue for the most part to analyse concepts 
such as duty, right and welfare after the fashion of Hare et. al., without regard to their origin 
and development. This may look like sheer intellectual inertia, but an argument can be made 
– has been made – in defence of the approach. Most contemporary analytic philosophers 
think of concepts as abstractions from linguistic practice, whose identity is determined by 
their contribution to the truth-value of propositions of which they form a part. Concepts 
thought of in this way cannot change, any more than numbers or shapes can change. Words, 
however, can change in the concepts that they express; hence to say that a concept has 
changed is just a misleading way of saying that a word which once expressed one concept 
now expresses another. A division of intellectual labour thus suggests itself: philosophers 
have responsibility for the analysis of concepts, historians for the history of words. A similar 
division has been proposed by some historians themselves. “The various transformations we 
can hope to chart will not strictly speaking be changes in concepts at all”,  Quentin Skinner 
has written. “They will be transformations in the applications of the terms by which our 
concepts are expressed.”7 
This picture of concepts has allowed analytic philosophers to persevere in their traditionally 
ahistorical style of analysis but without the universalism that once accompanied it. Their job, 
as they see it, is to get clear about what “we” – more on that treacherous pronoun in a 
moment – think about justice, welfare etc., in full awareness that others in the past have 
thought differently. Concepts are, so to speak, stills from the moving picture of human 
speculation, set apart for purposes of formal analysis. They are changeless not because they 
are eternal but because change has been excluded from them by definition.  
The first thing to say about this style of analysis is that it represents a massive retreat from 
the classical ambition of philosophy, which was to say something universally true about the 
basic structures of reality and of human life. This ambition still inspired earlier versions of 
conceptual analysis, insofar as they took as their object the universal logic or “grammar” of 
human thought. But when analysis confines itself to what “we” would say about x, y or z, its 
                                                 
7 Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 179 
only function is to give precision to the vagaries of contemporary usage. Philosophy appears 
to have become empirical sociolinguistics. 
Yet if this really is empirical sociolinguistics, why is it done so badly? Claims about popular 
linguistic intuitions abound, but evidence to support them is nowhere to be found. All we get 
are blank assertions along the lines of “we would say ...”, which sounds suspiciously like 
philosophers generalising from what they would say – a flagrant fallacy, as exponents of “ex-
phi” are quick to point out. But perhaps the “we would say ...” formula should be understood 
not as a generalisation about what we actually do say but as an invitation to reflect on what 
we ideally should say, the “we” here referring not to some empirical collectivity but to (as it 
were) “you and I, dear reader.” But in that case, concepts are not abstractions from current 
usage after all but norms to which current usage can conform or fail to conform – the very 
Platonism that modern analytic philosophy has officially left behind.  
This sort of underhand normativity about concepts runs through much recent work in analytic 
philosophy, of which Fred Feldman’s What is this Thing Called Happiness? is representative. 
The ostensible target of Feldman’s analysis is “the ordinary, somewhat obscure thing that the 
unperverted English-speaking person on the street means when he or she says that someone is 
‘happy’.”8 That suggests an empirical investigation into average English usage, though as 
usual no evidence for such usage is ever produced. But look again at that oddly moralistic 
adjective “unperverted”. What is it doing here? We find the answer some fifty pages earlier: 
“I think ‘happy’ is used in the evaluative sense only by philosophers and others whose good 
linguistic instincts have been perverted by them. Perhaps this usage harks back to a fumbled 
attempt to find a good English word to translate the Greek eudaimonia.”9 But by what right 
does Feldman dismiss as “perverted” the usage of many bona fide English speakers, some of 
them uncorrupted by philosophy?  Couldn’t his own hedonistic understanding of happiness 
be put down with equal justice to the “perverting” influence of Benthamite utilitarianism? Or 
is Feldman perhaps claiming some special “intuition” (using that word now in its classical 
sense) into what happiness really is? But if so, how could he hope to vindicate such a claim? 
This style of conceptual analysis is fatally incoherent. It claims to take its bearing from the 
linguistic intuitions of a given population, but where those intuitions conflict, as in all 
                                                 
8 Fred Feldman, What is This Thing Called Happiness? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 186. 
9 Feldman, What is This Thing Called Happiness?, 136. 
interesting cases they do, it has no way of resolving the conflict consistent with its own 
premises. For it, intuitions are simply data. If we reject some, it can only be because they are 
incompatible with others we wish to affirm, not because they are inherently “perverted”. The 
decision which intuitions to affirm and which to reject is ultimately arbitrary; one person’s 
modus ponens is another’s modus tollens. I have argued the case with reference to happiness, 
but I could equally have focused on virtue, vice, prudence, freedom and justice. In all these 
cases, intuitions differ systematically in a way that seems beyond the power of philosophical 
argument to settle. But there is no need to labour the point. It has been made with great force 
by Alasdair MacIntyre. 
It is just here that a historical approach to concepts can advance matters, in two respects. 
First, it can explain conflicts in our intuitions, by uncovering their origins in our divided 
cultural inheritance. And second, it can (at least sometimes) help us to resolve such conflicts, 
by revealing one side or the other as a product of social and intellectual developments we 
have reason to reject. A purely synchronic approach is helpless on both fronts. From its point 
of view, intuitions must remain a brute given, incapable of either explanation or evaluation. 
Our only task is to “save” the strongest or most numerous of our intuitions, discarding the 
rest in the interests of coherence (“biting the bullet” as it is inelegantly called). Philosophy is 
thereby reduced to the systematisation of prejudice. There is an analogy to be drawn with the 
way in which neo-classical economics, by abstracting from the process of want formation, 
deprives itself of all resources for explaining and judging wants, leaving only the question of 
their satisfaction. 
But enough generalities. Let me provide a concrete example of the power of the historical 
method, focussing again on the concept of happiness. A historical analysis can, I will argue, 
give substance to Feldman’s claim that certain uses of “happy” are “perverted”, though it will 
turn out that these are precisely the uses which he regards as exemplary.  
Happiness in historical perspective  
What little Feldman says about the history of the concept of happiness is exactly wrong. The 
evaluative sense of “happiness” was not an invention of philosophers struggling to translate 
eudaimonia. On the contrary, it was the original, common meaning of the term. To be happy 
was to enjoy good “hap” or luck, an association preserved in stock phrases such as “happy 
chance” and “happy day”. By the Elizabethan period, the implication of good luck had 
receded somewhat, but the word still referred to an objectively desirable condition of being, 
not just a pleasant state of mind. “We few, we happy few”, says Shakespeare’s Henry V to 
his troops before Agincourt, knowing that many of them will be maimed or killed. “If ye 
suffer for righteousness’ sake, happy are ye”, runs the King James version of 1 Peter 3:14. 
“Happy” in this sense is a pure “verdictive”; it signifies success in life, but carries no 
implications as to what that success might consist in. The same is true of eudaimon as used 
by Plato, Aristotle and other ancient Greek philosophers. Thus when English translators of 
ancient philosophy sought an equivalent of eudaimonia, “happiness” came readily to hand.  
Beginning in the late sixteenth century, however, “happiness” took on its standard modern 
meaning of “a state of pleasurable contentment of mind” (O.E.D.). Shakespeare provides us 
with an early example. “To sour your happiness,” says Cornelius to Cymbeline, “I must 
report the queen is dead.”10 “Happiness” here must refer to a state of mind, not “good hap”, 
or Cymbeline would not need to be informed of the death of his queen in order to lose it; he 
would already have lost it by the mere fact of her death. Some time later, “happy” acquired 
the colloquial sense of “glad” or “pleased”, which (assuming the normal relationship between 
adjectives and their cognate nouns) must have further strengthened the psychological 
associations of “happiness”. By the mid-eighteenth century, this development was complete. 
Samuel Johnson defined “happiness” firstly as “felicity; state in which the desires are 
satisfied” and only secondly as “good luck; good fortune”.11 Jeremy Bentham, writing in 
1781, was content to define utility as “that property in any object, whereby it tends to 
produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in the present case comes 
to the same thing).”12 
Parallel developments occurred in other European languages. The German word Glück 
originally meant simply luck or good luck, acquiring the additional sense of contentment or 
joy in the late Middle Ages. (Both senses remain active to this day, as Ute Frevert reminds us 
in this volume.) The indistinguishability of Glück (= happiness) and Glück (= luck) troubled 
philosophers like Leibniz, who lighted upon an alternative word, Glückseligkeit, to designate 
                                                 
10 Cymbeline act V, sc. V, line 27. See O.E.D.. The O.E.D. lists a couple of examples of “happiness” in this sense 
dating from 1500 and 1534, but they both seem to me to admit of interpretation as “good hap”.   
11 Samuel Johnson, Dictionary of the English Language (London: Strahan, 1755), vol. 1, 965. 
12 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. 1.3. In Jeremy Bentham, 
A Fragment on Government and An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1967), 126.  
happiness as an enduring inner state, invulnerable to fortune.13 Glückseligkeit soon 
established itself as the standard counterpart to eudaimonia in philosophical German, yet its 
ordinary sense was always more spiritualised than that of the Greek term, and became still 
more so over time (Lutheranism was an influence here, as was the fallacy, widespread in the 
eighteenth century, that the selig in glückselig derives from Seele, “soul”).14 All this 
contributed to the revolt against eudaimonism in the late eighteenth century. Kant, the leader 
of that revolt, saw no essential difference between Glückseligkeit and Glück; both for him 
were mere psychological states, incapable of grounding duty. Morals, as he famously put it, 
“is not properly the doctrine of how we are to make ourselves happy but of how we are to 
become worthy of happiness”.15 
The main French word for happiness, bonheur, also originally signified good luck, as its 
etymology (bon heur = good hour) might suggest. However, from the fifteenth century 
onwards it too came to denote a state of joy or contentment, drawing close in meaning to 
“pleasure”.16 “I am enjoying heavenly happiness (bonheur)”, cries Éradice, a character in the 
popular eighteenth-century pornographic novel, Thérèse Philosophe, as she is ravished by the 
lecherous Father Dirrag.17 Pleasure is “the happiness of an instant, an element of happiness”, 
runs an entry in Pierre-Benjamin Lafaye’s 1858 Dictionnaire des Synonymes.18 
Today, the psychological sense of “happiness” is unquestionably the dominant one, though 
the original evaluative meaning remains active under the surface. Some well-known thought 
experiments help bring this out. We hesitate to describe as “happy” a woman who is deeply 
deluded about core aspects of her life, however much fun she is having.19 And we would 
probably not say that a doctor who performed a lobotomy on a new-born baby after hearing 
its parents express a wish for its happiness had correctly interpreted their meaning.20 In an 
episode of the TV series, Mad Men, ad executive Roger Sterling grumbles at the chilly 
                                                 
13 See Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm Grimm, ed. Theodor Kochs, Joachim Bahr and 
others (Leipzig, S. Hirzel: 1958), vol. 4, 347.  
14 See the article on “Glück” by Christian Helmreich, in Barbara Cassin (ed.), Dictionary of Untranslatables: A 
Philosophical Lexicon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 397-402.  
15 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 108. 
16 See “Bonheur” in Le Grand Robert de la Langue Française (Paris, Le Robert: 1985), Vol. 2, 67-8.   
17 Thérèse philosophe, ed. Florence Lotterie (Paris: Flammarion, 2007), 98. 
18 Pierre-Benjamin Lafaye, Dictionnaire des Synonymes de la Langue Française (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1884), 
408.  
19  See Julia Annas, Intelligent Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 141 
20 See Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 85-6.  
reception handed out to him and his new bride, a vacuous young gold-digger. “It’s a mistake 
to be conspicuously happy: some people don’t like it”, he says to his friend Don Draper. “No 
one thinks you’re happy”, replies Don. “They think you’re foolish.”21 Since Roger clearly is 
happy in the ordinary, smiley-face sense, Don’s use of the word here must be understood as 
verdictive, yet it comes over as perfectly natural and idiomatic. Certainly no one could accuse 
this suave and worldly adman of having had his linguistic instincts perverted by philosophy! 
How should we describe this semantic situation? One superficially plausible view is that 
“happy” is a homonym. It has two quite different senses: a newer one, now standard, and an 
older one, now invoked only rarely. On this view, Don Draper is simply punning, as he might 
be had he said: “No one thinks you’re gay. They think you’re miserable”. But we need only 
to put the point this way to see that it is false. “Happy” is not homonymous, and Don Draper 
is not punning. When Roger says that he is happy, and Don says that he is not, they are 
disagreeing, not playing on words. Something Bernard Williams says about liberty is 
relevant here. “It is important”, Williams writes 
that the disputes that have circled around the various definitions and concepts of 
liberty do not just represent a set of verbal misunderstandings. They have been 
disagreements about something. There is even a sense in which they have been 
disagreements about some one thing. There must be a core, or a primitive 
conception, perhaps some universal or widely spread human experience, to 
which these conceptions relate. ... This core or primitive item ... can, and must, 
explain how these various accounts of the value of freedom are elaborations of 
the same thing, that these various interpretations are not just talking past one 
another.22 
As with liberty, so with happiness. This too must be “one thing” if we are to make sense of 
our impression that Roger and Don and all the others who have debated the concept are in 
genuine disagreement with one another, and not just at cross purposes. But what is this “one 
                                                 
21 Mad Men, Session 3, Episode 3.  
22 Bernard Williams, “From Freedom to Liberty: The Construction of a Political Value”, in Bernard Williams, In 
the Beginning was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2005), 76. 
thing”? A clue is offered by the verb “felicitate”, from the Latin word for happy.23 To call 
someone happy is, at a very minimum, to felicitate, to congratulate him, to say “well done!” 
It is not necessarily to say anything more than this. However, “happy” and its cognates have 
always been prone, by a natural process of association, to incorporate particular ideas about 
what merits felicitation – ideas which have varied according to the values of the society in 
question. In the popular language of fourth-century BC Athens, to call someone eudaimon 
was generally to imply that he was rich.24 When the heroines of eighteenth-century English 
novels look forward to, or wish each other, “happiness”, we know without further comment 
what they are talking about. For women in their situation, success in life means marriage. 
My claim, then, is that happiness’s new meaning of joy or contentment should be understood 
as a specification of its old meaning of success in life, not as an alternative to it. It represents 
a particular interpretation of what success in life is. That is why it remains appropriate to 
refuse to apply the word to characters like Roger, who, though joyful, contented etc., are in 
some obvious sense failures. Of course, not all uses of “happy” are evaluative. It would be 
absurdly solemn to respond to “I was happy to meet Sarah yesterday” with, “Ah, but were 
you really happy?” “Happy” here means nothing more than “glad”. But where the word is 
used deliberately, with emphasis – as in “I found happiness at last” or “I had a happy life” – it 
retains something of its original verdictive force, making the question “but did you really ...?” 
occasionally appropriate. 
These brief reflections on “happiness” illustrate a more general point. A word does not pass 
through the phases of its history like a train through railway stations. Its former uses remain 
latent within it, preserved in the classics of the literature and in those little fossilised idioms 
that are a feature of every natural language. This is why conceptual analysis cannot proceed 
in a purely synchronic fashion, as though the current meaning of a word could be completely 
sequestered from its previous meanings. It must proceed diachronically, or genealogically.25 
Analytic philosophers have something to learn from linguists here, as well as from thinkers in 
the hermeneutic tradition of Dilthey and Gadamer.   
                                                 
23 See Timothy Chappell, “Eudaimonia, Happiness, and the Redemption of Unhappiness”, Philosophical Topics 
41/1 (Spring 2013), 36. Chappell points out that “felicitate” has an almost exact counterpart in the ancient 
Greek verb eudaimonizein.  
24 Kenneth Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 174.  
25 Hannah Dawson makes a similar point in her essay in this volume, “Shame: from Sin to Sociability”, ....   
But back to “happiness”. I have suggested that its dominant modern meaning of “joy” or 
“contentment” represents a specification or interpretation of its original meaning of “success 
in life”. But the question remains: why this interpretation? Why did the meaning of the word 
become narrowed in this way and not some other? Some light on this question is shed by the 
founders of modern philosophy, Descartes, Hobbes and Locke. Their reflections on happiness 
are of particular relevance here, not so much for their subsequent influence – though this was 
undoubtedly great – as for the light they cast on intellectual motives already at work in the 
spontaneous evolution of the term’s meaning. They show us, more clearly than other sources, 
just why Europeans of the early modern period began to think of success in life as a matter of 
achieving certain states of mind.  
The Descartes/Hobbes/Locke view of happiness can be represented as the conclusion of an 
argument, the first premise of which is conventionally Aristotelian: happiness is the final and 
comprehensive object of human desire. Everything we want we want either as a means to, or 
as a part of, happiness. But (second premise) the real object of our desires is only ever a 
mental state. We may say we want to eat an apple or see a movie, but what we really want is 
the pleasure that accompanies eating the apple or seeing the movie. From these two premises, 
the conclusion follows directly: if the real object of desire is always a mental state, then 
happiness, as the final and comprehensive object of desire, must itself be a mental state. The 
argument as a whole is, of course, a characteristic product of the Cartesian revolution. It 
reflects a picture of the mind as occupied exclusively with its own contents, receiving only 
causal impacts from the world outside – a picture that dominated modern philosophy from 
Descartes through to Heidegger and Wittgenstein. 
Variations on this argument are implicit in all three of our seventeenth-century witnesses. 
Descartes’ late work, The Passions of the Soul, characterises desire, conventionally enough, 
as involving a “volition to acquire some good or avoid some evil”. It adds, however, that this 
good lies ultimately in the mental state of joy, “for in fact the soul receives no other benefit 
from all the goods it possesses; and as long as it derives no joy from them, we may say that it 
does not enjoy them any more than it would if did not possess them at all.”26 This 
“motivational internalism” (as we can call it) also underlies a letter of Descartes to Princess 
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Elizabeth of Bohemia, in which he insists, against Seneca and the whole ancient tradition, 
that happiness is something distinct from the supreme good. The supreme good is 
“undoubtedly the thing we ought to set ourselves as the goal of all our actions”, but it is only 
insofar as it is correlated with happiness, defined as “contentment or satisfaction of mind”, 
that we have a motive to seek it out in practice: 
Suppose there is a prize for hitting a bull’s-eye: you can make people want to hit 
the bull’s-eye by showing them the prize, but they cannot win the prize if they do 
not see the bull’s-eye; conversely, those who see the bull’s-eye are not thereby 
induced to fire at it if they do not know there is a prize to be won. So too virtue, 
which is the bull’s-eye, does not come to be strongly desired when it is seen all on 
its own, and contentment, like the prize, cannot be gained unless it is pursued.27  
Hobbes’ Leviathan, written at about the same time as Descartes’ Passions of the Soul and 
bearing clear marks of Cartesian influence,28 contains a statement of the same motivational 
internalism: all desire or appetite is for what is good, or, more precisely, for what promises 
pleasure – pleasure being simply “the appearance, or sense of Good”.29 Happiness (“felicity” 
Hobbes calls it) is nothing but the pleasure of satisfying desire – not just once and for all, but 
over and over, because “Life it selfe is but Motion, and can never be without Desire”:30   
For there is no such Finis ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor Summum Bonum,  (greatest 
Good,) as is spoken in the books of the old Morall Philosophers. Nor can a man 
any more live, whose Desires are at an end, than he, whose Senses and 
Imaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a continuall progress of the desire, from 
one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the 
latter.31  
Locke, building on Descartes and Hobbes, states the crucial premise even more clearly: “We 
love, desire, rejoice, and hope, only in respect of pleasure; we hate, fear, and grieve, only in 
respect of pain ultimately: in fine, all these passions are moved by things only as they appear 
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to be the causes of pleasure and pain, or to have pleasure or pain some way or another 
annexed to them.”32 Happiness, as the ultimate object of our desires, must be “the utmost 
pleasure we are capable of, and misery the utmost pain.”33 Locke sees that this view of the 
matter makes idle all traditional debates about the “real” nature of happiness: 
The philosophers of old did in vain inquire, whether Summum bonum consisted in 
riches, or bodily delights, or virtue, or contemplation. And they might have 
reasonably disputed, whether the best relish were to be found in apples, plums or 
nuts; and have divided themselves into sects upon it. For as pleasant tastes depend 
not on the things themselves, but their agreeableness to this or that particular 
palate, wherein there is great variety; so the greatest happiness consists in the 
having those things which produce the greatest pleasure, and the absence of those 
which cause any disturbance, any pain. Now, these to different men are very 
different things.34  
In sum, Descartes, Hobbes and Locke all continue to use the word “happiness” in the 
traditional sense, as a name for our heart’s desire. But because they conceive of desire as 
something that can only ever be directed towards states of mind, they must perforce conceive 
of happiness too as a state of mind; and thus the old evaluative sense gets overlaid with a new 
descriptive one. I’m not claiming that this exact argument passed explicitly through the mind 
of every seventeenth-century Jo Blogs who used the word “happiness” in the new sense. But 
we must assume that it, or something like it, was there implicitly if we are to make sense of 
the transformation in the term’s meaning. Moreover – and this is the key point – the argument 
is a flagrantly wrong-headed one. States of mind are not always what we really want. 
Sometimes they are, as when we set out to get drunk or to feel weepy, but such cases are 
recognisable by contrast with more typical instances of human striving. “We don’t start love-
affairs to secure the stimulation of our pubic nerve”, writes Michael Frayn. “(That would be 
an insanely long way round to go, like buying a car to get the use of the cigar lighter.)”35 But 
I’m not going to argue the point further here. I shall trust to my readers’ good sense and move 
on. 
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But isn’t this all just a matter of old history, my adversary might at this point protest. The 
confusions surrounding the birth of a concept need not accompany it forever, or else (to 
revert to my old analogy) the modern meaning of “gay” might be rejected on the grounds that 
it grew out of a mistaken belief that all homosexuals are cheerful. But “happiness” is not like 
“gay”, as I’ve said already. Its older and newer senses are not two separate things. The one is 
hidden in the other like a Jack-in-the-box, meaning that every time we call someone happy in 
the smiley-face sense we risk implying, fallaciously, that he has achieved his life’s aim. The 
confusions of the seventeenth century are also our confusions. 
So how should we respond to this predicament? We could just stipulate that “happiness” be 
confined to purely descriptive uses, introducing a quasi-technical substitute like “welfare” or 
“flourishing” to designate success in life. But that would be a mistake, for two reasons. First, 
“happiness” as a term of ordinary language is not ours to define at will. Trying to limit its 
meaning by fiat will only create confusion, in our own minds as well as others’ (think of the 
mischief done with “nonsense” by A. J. Ayer or with “selfish” by Richard Dawkins). Second, 
I am not sure that “happiness” in the verdictive sense has any exact equivalents. 
“Flourishing” and “welfare” are both too determinate. They pick out the specifically 
“prudential” good, the good which is for him or her. “Happiness” is not restricted in this way. 
“If ye suffer for righteousness’ sake, flourishing/faring well are ye” sounds all wrong, and not 
just for stylistic reasons.  
My own preference would be to resolve the ambiguity in the other direction, by reserving 
“happy” for situations where felicitations really are in order. I am not of course suggesting 
that we tick people off for saying “I’m happy to drive you to the station” etc.; that would be 
intolerably pedantic.  But where the word can be taken to imply a verdict, a false verdict, we 
do well to look for alternatives. Hugh Hefner no doubt had a pleasant and fun life. I am not 
sure he had a happy life. 
Conclusion 
I hope to have shown two things in this essay. First, our moral concepts are not universal or 
timeless. “Guilt”, “shame”, “happiness”, “duty” – such words can change, and when they do, 
the things they stand for change too. If there is a permanent core behind this flux, it is visible 
only darkly and obliquely, perhaps in certain characteristic human experiences and gestures, 
perhaps also in the great narratives of world literature. Second, moral philosophers cannot 
hope to insulate themselves from this flux by confining their attention to an ideal present. 
Moral concepts are a product of history, intelligible only in relation to history. Conceptual 
analysis implies historical analysis. 
Does this represent a surrender to relativism? Not at all. On the contrary, it is precisely the 
“time-slice” method currently in favour among analytic philosophers that represents the real 
victory of relativism, for where philosophy confines itself to harmonising our “intuitions” – 
meaning, to put it plainly, the conventional prejudices of modern academic philosophers – it 
tacitly abandons all aspiration to a deeper and more permanent point of view.  We are 
condemned to a kind of provincialism, a shuffling back and forth among the small circle of 
currently licenced commonplaces. Only history can liberate us from this provincialism, by 
uncovering the sources of what passes among us for common sense. (I have sketched what 
such an “uncovering” might look like in relation to happiness; no doubt a similar approach 
could be extended to other moral concepts.) Philosophy can be something more than “its own 
time apprehended in thought”, but only if it first becomes conscious of the extent to which it 
is its own time apprehended in thought. It cannot transcend time by simply ignoring it, in the 
manner of most analytic philosophy. 
